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I.

INTRODUCTION

For the past four decades, the Bonneville Power Administration (BPA) has played a singular and powerful role in developing the Northwest regional electric power system, and indirectly in the regional economy that system supports. The federal
government's decision during the first half of this century to
develop multi-purpose water resource projects led to the construction of many dams, most of them in the Western United
States, most built since the mid-1930's, and most including
hydroelectric generation.1
Congress has designated BPA2 as the marketing agent for
power and energy produced at these federal dams in the Northwest,3 and recently authorized BPA to serve also as marketing
agent for certain non-federal power resources, most of which are
still under construction.' As a complement to its marketing role,
* L.L.B., University of Washington, 1935; U.S. House of Representatives, 1941-1953;
U.S. Senate, 1953-present; Chairman, Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
now the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, 1963 to 1981. Senator Jackson
has played a leading role in resource development policy, including legislation affecting
the Bonneville Power Administration, throughout his service in Congress. He sponsored
the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act in the Senate.
1. Outside the Tennessee Valley, which is provided bulk power by the Tennessee
Valley Authority, a federal corporation pursuant to the Tennessee Valley Authority Act
of 1933, 16 U.S.C. §§ 831-831dd (1976 & Supp. 1I 1979), either the Army Corps of Engineers or the Bureau of Reclamation (now the Water and Power Resources Service) constructed federal multipurpose dams. The Alaska Power Administration, Bonneville
Power Administration (BPA), Southeastern Power Administration, Southwestern Power
Administration, and Western Area Power Administration, all agencies of the Department
of Energy, market energy from these dams. See note 3 infra.
2. BPA formerly was an agency of the Department of the Interior but is now part of
the Department of Energy. See 42 U.S.C. § 7152(a)(1)(D) (Supp. 11 1978).
3. The BPA Administrator's general marketing authority is set forth at 16 U.S.C.
§ 832a (1976), as amended by Federal Columbia River Transmission System Act, Pub.
L. No. 93-454, § 2, 88 Stat. 1376 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 838 (1976)).
4. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 91-144, 83 Stat. 323 (1969); Pub. L. No. 91-439, 84 Stat. 890
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BPA has constructed and operates a sophisticated and complex
regional transmission grid that is one of the world's best.5
Since the federal government constructed the Bonneville
and Grand Coulee dams in the 1930's, energy from the Federal
Columbia River Power System has been available at low cost
and in ample quantities. Oil, natural gas, and coal indigenous to
other regions are almost nonexistent in the Northwest. Consequently, the region is much more dependent on electric energy
than the United States as a whole. The average Northwest consumer uses twice as much electric energy as consumers in the
nation as a whole; however, Northwesterners use much less of
other forms of energy. Indeed, per capita consumption of all
forms of energy in the Northwest is slightly less than the
national average.
II.

THE NEED FOR A REGIONAL PLANNING MECHANISM

As we enter the 1980's, fundamental changes have occurred.
Historically, BPA has had sufficient resources to sell power to
any utility or other customer in the region. Until recently,
finding markets for the abundant low-cost federal power was a
perennial problem. However, the era of abundance has abruptly
ended. The entire region now faces substantial electric energy
deficits for the foreseeable future.'
(1970). BPA also markets certain hydroelectric energy made available through a treaty
with Canada, energy from the Hanford nuclear reactor, and power acquired through net
billing with preference customers. See Foote, Larsen & Maddox, Bonneville Power
Administration:Northwest Power Broker, 6 ENv. L. REV. 831, 841-43 (1976).
5. In 1974, Congress granted BPA the right to issue bonds to finance transmission
improvements and for other purposes. Federal Columbia River Transmission System
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-454, § 13, 88 Stat. 1376 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 838k (1976)). Largely
because of BPA's preeminent role as a power marketing and transmission agency, a cohesive, integrated power supply system large enough to construct efficient units and realize
operating efficiencies has evolved in the Northwest region. For a general discussion of
system size, electric transmission development and their impact on power pooling efficiencies, see S. BREYER & P. MAcAvoY, ENERGY REGULATION BY THE FEDERAL POWER
COMMISSION 106, 107 (1974); Marritz & Culp, Governmental Impediments to Electric

System Efficiency Through Integration, in 2
(1979).
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Since 1973, the Bonneville Power Administration has been
unable to sell any firm power to private utilities. Beginning on
July 1, 1983, BPA will have insufficient resources to supply all
the needs of its present publicly-owned utility customers with
"preference" rights under the Bonneville Project Act. It will terminate service to direct-service industrial customers (DSI's) as
their present contracts expire and each DSI will have to seek
alternate service, probably through a nearby utility.'
As existing DSI and public agency power sales contracts
expire, BPA must "allocate" all of the power from those contracts in accordance with the "preference clause" among public
bodies and cooperatives that want a share of it.8 Each preference

customer will receive a portion of the federal resources, but not
enough to meet all its requirements. Under present law, BPA
has no authority to secure sufficient power resources to eliminate
the need for allocation. The allocation process, which has
already begun, is likely to be lengthy and contentious.
Given the enormous economic value of the federal hydro
resource in the Northwest, someone almost certainly will challenge the final allocation policy in the federal courts. Neither
this litigation, nor its unknown outcome, will be conducive to
the cooperation and certainty essential to planning and operating an interdependent bulk power industry. The formation of
additional public agency customers seeking the federal system's
economic benefits, service requests to utilities from present
DSI's, the growing overall regional shortage of electric power
capacity, and the lack of any effective regionally financed and
coordinated conservation program will further complicate the
allocation process.
The Northwest needs a regional mechanism for planning
and developing its electric energy future. It must be a mecha7. Because of a large, long-term surplus of electric energy from federal projects in
the Northwest, BPA was able to sell energy surplus to the needs of preference customers
to investor-owned utilities (IOU's) and direct service industrial customers (DSI's), most
of them producers of aluminum ingot. BPA terminated firm energy sales to IOU's in
1973 under the five-year notice of withdrawal provisions. See 16 U.S.C. § 832(d)(a)
(1976). Contracts with DSI's are not subject to these withdrawal provisions, but BPA will
not renew them when they expire between 1981 and 1991. See 44 Fed. Reg. 57,824
(1979).
8. The Bonneville Project Act of 1937 requires that "the administrator at all times,
in disposing of electric energy ....
give preference and priority to public bodies and
cooperatives." 16 U.S.C. § 832c(a) (1976). Under this authority BPA sells firm power to
municipalities, rural electric cooperatives, and public power districts in Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana.
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nism assuring early public and governmental involvement from
throughout the region. The present system simply does not permit such regionally coordinated planning. Too often public
involvement begins at after-the-fact licensing and siting hearings
that are adversary in nature and, consequently, an inefficient
way to reach timely and considered planning decisions. Early
public involvement would provide agreement on power needs
and the best means of meeting them before specific resource
planning begins.
Northwest utilities presently operate as an integrated
regional utility system. The entire region will suffer if the integrity and reliability of any major part of that system is
threatened. No class of customer or consumer would be immune
from the effects of shortages and chaotic utility planning. These
general problems have some specific and immediate implications
for BPA customer groups.

III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF INACTION
Existing Preference Customers

A.

The vast majority of BPA's 115 existing preference customers now receive 100% of their power supply from BPA. Exactly
how these utilities will be able to provide additional resources to
meet their responsibility to serve growing loads is unclear. If
BPA eventually adopts its proposed allocation policy, public
agencies would receive a base allocation, but would not know
from year to year how much federal power they might receive.
Meanwhile, forty-three preference customer contracts expire
between 1984 and 1986, which is much too soon for those utilities to plan and acquire additional resources, even if they were
sure what their additional unmet requirements might be.
B.

New Preference Customers

Some areas now served by private utilities will almost certainly try to form new public agencies so they can receive the
economic benefits of the federal system. If BPA had sufficient
power to serve additional preference customers this development
would not complicate the planning process, but under present
conditions such systems would have no assurance of a power
supply. New preference customer formation may or may not be
desirable in itself; but without sufficient power to meet all
potential demands, such a development would reduce each pub-
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lic agency's relative share of the federal power supply, and
increase the complexity and contentiousness of the BPA allocation process. The establishment of new preference customers
would not result in the production or conservation of any additional kilowatts, but it would add to the Northwest's difficulties
in making rational utility planning decisions.
C.

Direct Service Industries

Direct service industries are of regional and national economic significance. Most notable among the DSI customers are
aluminum reduction mills producing one-third of the nation's
primary aluminum. Aluminum is increasingly important in
national efforts to improve automobile fuel efficiency and provide other modes of transportation. It also is significant in
national defense programs. DSI's provide thousands of jobs in
the Northwest and historically have reduced utility rates in the
region by providing operating reserves and a market for surplus
power. However, BPA will be unable to continue serving DSI's
as their contracts expire over the next decade. Consequently,
DSI's will have to apply to utilities for service, or attempt to
develop or acquire their own generating resources. The DSI's
will argue that they have legal rights to service under state laws,
and ultimately they will likely prevail; however, courts may take
years to determine which utility will serve which DSI and at
what price. The delay while the courts made these decisions
would subject thousands of jobs, large amounts of plant and
equipment, and nationally important economic productivity to
years of uncertainty. Companies would delay decisions about
plant modernization, which could produce significant conservation savings in this energy intensive industry, until the courts
clearly resolved these questions.
By accident of history and geography, eighty-five per cent of
the DSI loads are located in or adjacent to public agency service
areas. Many DSI's will apply to preference customers for a
power supply when their BPA contracts expire and most of
those preference customers will, in turn, seek additional power
from BPA to meet their suddenly increased loads. Like the formation of new preference customers, large increases in existing
public agencies' loads will not create additional power for BPA
to distribute-it will simply increase preference customer
demand for the limited existing supply and further complicate
the allocation process and utility planning in general.
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D. Private Utilities
Investor-owned utilities face the same overall power supply
problems confronting the entire region. Forecasters predict that
the 1980's will be a decade of shortages and curtailments in any
year of poor water conditions in the Northwest.
A more immediate problem for the private utilities, however, is that their rates are becoming significantly higher than
public agency rates. In some areas private rates are two or three
times higher than public rates. The most important reason for
this disparity is that private utilities have lost their ready access
to firm BPA hydropower and have had to cross the "thermal
threshold" to high-cost coal and nuclear generation years before
public agencies have had to do so. The privates lost their firm
BPA supply in 1973 when BPA reclaimed it to serve the needs
of public bodies and cooperatives as the Bonneville Act's preference clause requires.
Public agencies are beginning to experience similar cost
increases as they blend the costs of their own thermal resources
with the large but fixed pool of federal hydropower. Even if the
existing public agencies could retain their exclusive use of the
federal system, public agency rates would eventually catch up
with private utility rates. However, the enormous economic
advantage the federal system provides to existing public agencies is the very reason why the formation of new public agencies
out of private utility service areas will accelerate the catch-up
process. This poses a direct threat to the continued existence of
investor-owned utilities. But, in the absence of a legislative settlement like that in the Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act,9 this process would continue and
private utility customers would probably reap a net benefit
despite the private utilities' demise, because existing lower cost
resources would stretch further to serve remaining consumers.
Public agency customers could face serious economic disadvantages, however. Compensation for the new publics' acquisition of private utility properties would be expensive. Most DSI's
would seek federal system service through public agencies,
thereby reducing federal hydropower availability. The legal battle over every available scrap of federal power would be on, mak9. See S. 885, 96th Cong., 1st Seas., S. REP. No. 272, 96th Cong., 1st Ses. (1979)
[hereinafter cited as S. 8851; H.R. 8157, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) [hereinafter cited as
H.R. 8157].
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ing planning and sensible economic decision-making almost
impossible. The disputes and uncertainty would seriously dilute
the economic benefits of the federal system for existing preference customers and greatly reduce the net amount of available
power.
E. All Customer Groups
In addition to legal contests of the allocation process itself,
there would likely be condemnation suits, litigation involving
new preference customer formation, "duty to serve" suits
between large industries and utilities trying to avoid serving
them, and suits to block financing of any significant resource on
the basis that the sponsor may not need the resource. The litigation would create turmoil throughout the Northwest economy,
which is extraordinarily dependent on electric energy.
IV.

NEEDED: RULES FOR ORDERLY PLANNING

What the Pacific Northwest needs most are some rules to
play by: rules for allocation, rules for planning and conservation,
and rules enabling the region to efficiently integrate new
resources, including conservation, with the hydro system. Entities other than the federal government will likely finance and
own most future resources, but the region must carefully plan
and operationally integrate them with existing resourcesincluding those of the federal government.
The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, 10 which I cosponsored in the Senate with Senators
Magnuson, Church, Hatfield, McClure, and Packwood, would
guide the Northwest during this transition period in three
important respects:
A.

Allocation of Federal Hydropower

Instead of allowing the region to fall into lengthy wrangling
over how much power BPA should allocate to which customer,
the bill would legislatively allocate power supplies and costs.
B.

Cooperative Regional Planning

The bill would establish a public, region-wide planning pro10. See S. 885, supra note 9.
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cess that would guide and control BPA's exercise of purchase
authority within the confines of a regional plan. A Regional
Planning Council, in which the Northwest states would participate directly, would develop the plan. Local governments, utilities, interested citizens and groups would all have access to the
Council and could participate in its proceedings and the development of its plan.
C. Conservation Priorities
The bill would make conservation the highest priority
resource. Renewable resources also would have priority over conventional resources. Such resources frequently have environmental advantages and avoid consumption of depletable fuels.
V. BPA

PURCHASE AUTHORITY: KEY TO A LEGISLATIVE
SOLUTION

The Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act is an enormously complex bill dealing with the full
range of utility planning issues confronting the Northwest.
Despite its complexity, the nub of the bill is a relatively simple
concept called "purchase authority." This concept underlies the
solution to the outstanding utility planning problems described
above. Not only does purchase authority address these problems,
but in the more than three years the Senate has considered
regional power legislation, it is the only means we have found to
be both workable and effective.
"Purchase authority" would authorize the Bonneville Power
Administration to acquire additional non-federal resources,
including conservation. BPA could then enter into new contracts
with all Northwest customers to serve their needs at rates specified in the bill. Purchase authority would enable BPA to eliminate the present insufficiency and avert the allocation battle
over the limited federal resources. The ways in which BPA
would exercise purchase authority and the possible solutions it
could provide for the region's power planning problems include:
A.

Purchase Authority and Allocation

Under existing law, BPA cannot avoid an administrative or
judicial power allocation because the present supply is finite and
there is little prospect for adding more power to the system.
BPA has sold all its firm power to preference customers and

1980]

Solution for a Regional Dilemma

direct-service industrial consumers. Those contracts begin to
expire next year, and all will expire by 1995. The proposed allocation policy that BPA published in October, 1979,11 cannot
become final for almost two years, and then it would be subject
to challenge in the federal courts. Although the Ninth Circuit
precluded judicial review of one preference customer allocation
in Santa Clara v. Andrus,'2 a similar result would not necessarily obtain in the Pacific Northwest. The federal courts might
find a variety of bases to review the allocation. The crucial difficulty an administrative or judicial allocation poses is that it
might not become final for perhaps a decade.
Because most of BPA's 115 preference customers presently
receive their total supply from BPA, circumstances and legal
uncertainties would prevent these systems from coherently planning to meet their future requirements. They would not know
how many new preference systems, like Oregon's proposed
Domestic and Rural Power Authority, might form and apply to
BPA for service or how many direct service industrial customers
would turn to preference customers for service when their BPA
contracts expire. Also, pending the outcome of the allocation
proceeding and other lawsuits, they would not know the results
of the many contested issues. Such a situation is intolerable with
the region confronting possible serious power deficits each year
in the 1980's.
The purchase authority and allocation provisions of the bill
assure BPA an adequate power supply to meet its customers'
requirements, thus eliminating the need for the region to endure
what one Northwest governor called a "regional civil war" over
the allocation of Bonneville power.'8 The bill would resolve the
11. See 44 Fed. Reg. 57,824 (1979); cf. 45 Fed. Reg. 58,938 (1980) (modifying the
proposed conservation program standards to guidelines).
12. 572 F.2d 660 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 859 (1978). Santa Clara dealt with
the allocation of federally generated hydroelectric power marketed by the Bureau of Reclamation in California. The Ninth Circuit held that the federal marketing law in question provided no statutory standard for the court to apply on review, id. at 668, aside
from the clear mandate that sales be made with preference customers. Id. at 670. The
Bonneville Act, however, provides specific guidelines for preference customer formation
and financing. 16 U.S.C. § 832c(c)-(d) (1976). The statute specifies that "the general
public, and particularly ....
domestic and rural consumers" should benefit from federal
power sales, id. § 832c(a), and contains antimonopoly language which might well be the
basis of challenges to an administrative allocation, see id. § 832a(b).
13. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Supply and Conservation:Hearings on H.R.
9020, H.R. 9664, and H.R. 5862 Before the Subcomm. on Water and Power Resources of
the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Seas. 133 (1977)
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allocation problem by imposing a legislated "peace treaty" to
govern the supply and cost entitlement of BPA's customers. It
would direct BPA to enter into requirements contracts with its
preference customers, direct service industrial customers and
investor-owned utilities, as well as with federal agencies, to the
extent these systems elected to contract with BPA for their supply.14 It spells out the entitlements of individual BPA customers
in the event BPA does not have sufficient power to serve all its
customers' needs, 18 thus affording utilities and others a predictable planning base. The bill also sets forth a detailed allocation
of various costs to different BPA rates.1 6 It would give customer
groups a basis for computing their rates. Public agencies and
residential and small farm customers of private utilities would
be the favored customer class. They could use up the low-cost
federal system power before using higher cost power.
The purchase authority provision7 would permit BPA to
sign these requirements contracts, and to avoid allocating the
shortage it now contemplates. In addition, BPA could acquire
the production capability of specific conservation or resource
development measures. With the ability to acquire additional
nonfederal resources, BPA could contract to supply all its customers' requirements, thereby avoiding the problems associated
with imminent contract expiration dates and the need to
allocate.
The legal authority to acquire resources will not of itself be
enough to actually develop resources. But the additional provisions set forth in the bill, such as the resource acquisition procedures,18 and preconstruction financing of resource 9 costs, should
assist in their development. The cooperative planning process
the bill contemplates includes interaction between BPA and the
Pacific Northwest states on the Regional Planning Council.2 0
(statement of Gov. Dixy Lee Ray).
14. S. 885, supra note 9, § 5; accord, H.R. 8157, supra note 9, §§ 5(b), (d).
15. S. 885, supra note 9, §§ 5(a), (c); accord, H.R. 8157, supra note 9, §§ 5(a)-(b),
(d)-(e).
16. See S. 885, supra note 9, § 7; accord, H.R. 8157, supra note 9, § 7.
17. See S. 885, supra note 9, § 6; accord, H.R. 8157, supra note 9, § 6.
18. See S. 885, supra note 9, § 6; accord, H.R. 8157, supra note 9, § 6.
19. " 'Resource' means (1) electric power, including the actual or planned electric
power capability of generating facilities or (2) actual or planned load reduction resulting
from direct application of a renewable energy resource, or from a conservation measure."
S. 885, supra note 9, § 3(p); accord, H.R. 8157, supra note 9, § 3(19).
20. See S. 885, supra note 9, § 4; cf. H.R. 8157, supra note 9, § 4 (providing a different composition for the Council, among other distinctions). This section is the greatest
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That interaction should provide a useful early warning system
that would enlist the states' early cooperation. It would not,
however, preempt their siting, or other authorities."
Although purchase authority resolves the allocation problem, it was necessary for Congress to provide specific protections
for public body and cooperative customer systems, so they could
retain the federal system benefits to which they are entitled
under the Bonneville Project Act's preference clause. BPA's
Northwest preference customers, and other preference customer
groups throughout the country, insisted on retaining their
existing preference rights. Accordingly, the bill clearly reserves
these supply2" and economic23 benefits for existing preference
customers. It provides, in effect, that preference systems will pay
no more for power under the proposed legislation than they
would have paid if the legislation were never passed.2"
The bill provides for rate parity between the residential customers of public and private utilities. It accomplishes this rate
equivalency through two provisions: (1) an exchange of power on
behalf of residential customers, 5 and (2) a regional rate, based
on the lowest cost blocks of power, available to both preference
customers and residential consumers of all utilities participating
in the exchange.2
The circumstances permitting preference customers to
retain all their economic and supply benefits, while making
essentially equivalent economic benefits available to the residential consumers of any utility, are unique to the Northwest. They
involve (1) the presence of the enormous DSI load Bonneville
now serves, (2) the probability that without the regional bill
variation from the Senate bill.
21. S. 885, supra note 9, § 10(a); accord, H.R. 8157, supra note 9, § 10(a)(3).
22. S. 885, supra note 9, § 5(a); accord, H.R. 8157, supra note 9, §§ 5(a)-(b).
23. S. 885, supra note 9, § 7(b); accord, H.R. 8157, supra note 9, § 7(b).
24. See S. 885, supra note 9, § 7(b); accord, H.R. 8157, supra note 9, § 7(b). The
rate limit criteria of § 7(b) assume: (1) preference customers would serve DSI loads in or
adjacent to their service area during the applicable period; (2) preference customers
would receive all federal power not otherwise committed; (3) there is no residential utility exchange under Section 5(b)(2); (4) the remaining general requirements of preference
customers other than requirements met by available federal base system resources were
met first, with the least expensive resources owned or purchased by public bodies and
cooperatives and second, with other resources acquired by BPA at the average cost of
acquisition; and (5) preference customers do not achieve quantifiable money savings
under the bill resulting from reduced financing costs and reserve benefits. Id.; accord, S.
885, supra note 9, § 7(b).
25. See S. 885, supra note 9, § 5(b); accord, H.R. 8157, supra note 9, § 5(c).
26. See S. 885, supra note 9, § 5(b); accord, H.R. 8157, supra note 9, § 7(b).
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DSI's would turn to their local preference utility for service
when their BPA contracts expire, and (3) the DSIs' willingness
to pay more for power if they can be sure of a continued, reasonably priced supply. In essence, the DSIs' higher rates would
make lower rates possible for residential customers.
If BPA remained unable to enter into contracts with the
private utilities and DSI's, the rate parity compromise described
above would be impossible. Purchase authority would return
BPA to sufficiency and make such contracts possible. With it,
the DSI's would give up their present contracts and low-cost
power in return for an assurance of long-term supply at higher
costs; private utility customers would benefit from the low-cost
power freed through this exchange.
The bill's allocation scheme would make it unnecessary for
new preference systems to form, if their formation were only to
secure low-cost federal power for residential and small farm consumers. But it clearly assures essentially equivalent treatment to
any new preference systems that do form."' It would also provide the additional economic benefits of lower cost commercial
and industrial power for new preference systems. By contrast,
present law provides no assurance of an available BPA supply
for new public systems nor is one possible without enlarging
present supply through purchase authority.
B.

Purchase Authority and Regional Power Planning

In addition to granting BPA purchase authority the proposed Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act would establish statutory and administrative controls
over the exercise of that power. Overseeing BPA's acquisitions
would be a regional "publicly accountable" body. The bill's constraints on resource acquisition are (1) that BPA could purchase
only those resources its customers required, and (2) that
acquired resources would have to be cost-effective and consistent with a regionally-developed plan, or if no plan exists they
must be consistent with the bill's resource priorities and costeffectiveness criteria2 8 and Congressionally approved. Major
27. See S. 885, supra note 9, § 5(a); accord, H.R. 8157, supra note 9, § 5(b).
28. S. 885, supra note 9, §§ 4(e), 6(b); accord, H.R. 8157, supra note 9, §§ 4(e), 6(b).
Section 4(e) is the bill's basic priority provision: "The plan shall give the following priority to resources: first, to conservation; second, to renewable resources; third, to generating resources utilizing waste heat and generating resources of high fuel conversion efficiency; and fourth, to all other resources: Provided, that all such resources shall be cost
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resource acquisitions must also comply with rigorous procedures,
and would be subject to judicial review.2 9
It is not unusual for Congress to subject federal agency
actions to constraints exercised by a nonfederal body. Courts
have on many occasions upheld such schemes as constitutional. 0
Under the Senate bill, the Administrator could only acquire
resources that were consistent with a plan developed by a
Regional Council. Four of the five Council members would be
representatives of the Pacific Northwest states. To adequately
protect the federal interest, the Senate bill would require an
affirmative vote by the BPA Administrator plus at least two
other Council members for adoption of a regional plan.8 1 The
Council's composition and functions under the bill closely parallel a proposal by the four Northwest governors. 2
The states now have legal authority to determine future
power requirements and control facility licensing based on the
need for power and alternatives to the proposed facility. These
are essentially the kind of determinations the Regional Council
would make. But the bill also would create new federal interests
and obligations under the power purchase and sale authorities.
The purchase authority would create such a mixture of federal
and nonfederal interests as to almost require a regional planning
council anyway. Absent the proposed BPA purchase and contracting authority, there would be scant reason for federal intervention in the region's future power planning; likewise, there
would be little need for the states to seek control over BPA
activities.
The Council would be publicly accountable because the
effective and feasible." S. 885, supra note 9, § 4(e); accord, H.R. 8157, supra note 9,
§ 4(e)(1).
29. S. 885, supra note 9, § 9(e); accord, H.R. 8157, supra note 9, § 9(e).
30. See, e.g., California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978); Federal Power
Comm'n v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205 (1964); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
31. S. 885, supra note 9, § 4(b); cf. H.R. 8157, supra note 9, §§ 4(a)-(c) (BPA
Administrator not a member of the Council, and a majority, including at least one member from each state, or at least six members, must vote for a plan or amendment).
32. Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act: Hearings on
S. 885 Before the Senate Comm. on Energy and Natural Resources, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 56-59 (1979) (letter to Senator Henry M. Jackson from Gov. John V. Evans
(Idaho), Gov. Thomas L. Judge (Mont.), Gov. Victor Atiyeh (Or.), and Gov. Dixy Lee
Ray (Wash.), with attachment). The House bill differs from the Senate verison in that
the Council is enlarged to eight members, two from each state, and the BPA Administrator is not a member. H.R. 8157, supra note 9, § 4.
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respective governors would appoint and remove the state representatives pursuant to applicable state laws. To more fully
involve the general public in planning, the Council would hold
public hearings in each state during development of the regional
plan and substantial revisions thereto.38 The bill would require
the Administrator and Council to conduct programs to inform
and solicit the views of the general public and BPA's customers. 4 The regional plan, and other significant actions of the
Council and the Administrator, also would be subject to judicial
review."
The Senate bill also would grant mandatory billing credits
as a sort of counterbalance to BPA's purchase authority. Billing
credits would be available to BPA customers for (1) conservation
actions taken by them or political jurisdictions they serve, which
exceed the regional plan's requirements, and (2) renewable
resource or multipurpose projects they undertake and retain for
their use, so as to reduce their need for BPA power." This provision should encourage local initiative by those systems that do
not wish to depend entirely on BPA for their future supply. It
should also provide incentive for systems to develop their special
local conservation or resource opportunities. The bill would permit, but not require, credits for resources other than conservation, renewable, and multipurpose projects.
Purchase authority would permit BPA to acquire the
planned capability of projects not yet constructed, as well as
electric power that is actually available. The bill adopts this definition of resources because, in almost all cases, they would be
new resources not yet committed to particular uses. Once a project sponsor has borne the financial burdens and risks of the ten
to twelve years necessary to bring a major project on line it will
have committed the output by contract and by necessity to its
own loads. Similarly, if BPA requires an additional resource to
meet its regional customers' needs, it must acquire it before its
sponsors commit it to serve other loads.
33. S. 885, supra note 9, § 4(d); H.R. 8157, supra note 9, § 4(d)(1).
34. S. 885, supra note 9, § 4(g); accord, H.R. 8157, supra note 9, § 4(g) (adds the
requirement that the Council and Administrator consult with BPA clients and with state
and local governments).
35. S. 885, supra note 9, § 9(e); accord, H.R. 8157, supra note 9, § 9(e).
36. S. 885, supra note 9, § 6(h); accord, H.R. 8157, supra note 9, § 6(h)(1) (making
credits mandatory for conventional resources as well as conservation subject to certain
criteria, standards, and guidelines).
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According to standard industry practice, systems acquiring
new resource capability bear the risk that the completed project
may not operate satisfactorily. Investors who finance such
projects would not bear "dry hole" risks for the limited return
they receive. The regional bill would not change the normal distribution of risks; it merely would allocate the principal "dry
hole" risk of a BPA-purchased resource to all regional beneficiaries of the project; that is, to all of BPA's customers. Of
course, retail consumers ultimately pay the cost of "dry holes"
one way or another; a rate-making body's failure to allow current recovery of dry hole costs in rates would precipitate sharp
increases in the cost of new utility financing while merely delaying the rate increases to consumers.
The bill's allocation of dry hole risks is necessary because
although individual utilities or groups of utilities build
resources, all customers in the region use them. No utility board
or public service commission could prudently permit one utility
or group of utilities to bear all the risks of building a resource
when they had committed the resource's benefits to all of BPA's
customers by purchase contract. Such an allocation of risks and
benefits would be unfair and it is doubtful that many utilities
would sponsor a new plant on those terms.
The risk sharing aspect of purchase authority would not
give utility investors any special benefit. To the extent that BPA
purchase authority increased investor security, the financial
marketplace would reflect a lower investor return. Indeed, this
aspect of the legislation, by reducing financing costs, might do
more to reduce utility costs to Northwest consumers by reducing
financing charges than any other provision of the bill. Because
the utility business is so capital intensive, percentage points
saved on interest charges can amount to billions of dollars. Consumers would save these charges, which would otherwise appear
in utility bills.
Existing law would grant the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) authority to review and approve BPA
purchase contracts. 7 With the assistance of state regulatory
commissions, the FERC could establish the costs utilities could
pass on to BPA under such contracts.3 8 The U.S. Treasury
37. Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (1976).
38. Id.

22

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 4:7

would not bear any "dry hole" risks, 39 and there would be no
other federal subsidy for BPA acquisitions. BPA's customers
would bear all risks and share all benefits.
Finally, a point almost unrecognized by critics of the risk
sharing aspect of purchase authority: BPA purchases would
most benefit development of renewable and other unconventional resources. Investors see wind, solar, geothermal, and biomass resources as having greater "dry hole" risks than conventional resources. BPA purchases would increase the availability
of capital for such projects and significantly reduce the cost of
that capital.
C.

Purchase Authority and Conservation

BPA could undertake a significant conservation program
without comprehensive legislation, such as the Pacific Northwest
Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, if Congress
authorized it to do so. However, such a conservation program
could not be as effective without purchase authority. BPA's proposed allocation policy, if the regional bill does not pass, would
require its customer systems to realize energy savings of fifteen
per cent by a target date or demonstrate that they have
attempted to achieve such savings to the best of their ability. 0
Failing either of these, BPA would reduce customers' potential
allocations by approximately fifteen per cent. 1 If BPA adopted
this requirement as part of the final allocation policy, it would
no doubt yield some energy savings. BPA could also seek
authority to use the Bonneville Fund under its transmission and
self-financing authority to finance conservation activities, as a
recent House-passed bill proposed. 42 But these measures would
do only part of the job. Only comprehensive legislation, including purchase authority, can provide three crucial elements.
First, only a comprehensive bill would create a regional
resource planning process that would treat conservation as "supply" and place it first in priority for acquisition.4 3 Such a program of planned regional conservation, financiallly supported by
BPA purchase, would be impossible without comprehensive leg39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

S. 885, supra note 9, § 6(k); accord, H.R. 8157, supra note 9, § 6(j).
See 44 Fed. Reg. 57,824 (1979).
Id.
H.R. 3180, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., (1979).
See, e.g., S. 885, supra note 9, §§ 3(c), 4(e)(1), 6(a), 6(b).
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islation. The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) called the
bill's basic approach, which treats conservation as supply, "the
most important new idea regarding power and capacity questions of recent years."' Comparing the proposed Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act with utility
planning programs in other parts of the country, including the
Tennessee Valley Authority, the OTA report concluded the
Northwest power bill "would seem a much stronger lever to
encourage conservation choices in the Northwest ' 46 and that
"[o]ther regional electric associations, i.e., regional power planning and power pooling areas, lack authority to undertake simi' 46
lar initiatives."
Second, the bill would make BPA legally responsible for
meeting its contract requirements. Utilities that now are hesitant about their ability to rely individually on conservation as a
planned resource could undertake required conservation activities relatively secure that they would receive sufficient power
whether or not they meet their individual goals. It is far more
likely that the total BPA system could meet conservation goals
than could individual utilities. In this sense, as in the conventional resource supply sense, purchase authority and BPA's
expanded marketing role would make a region-wide risk sharing
pool possible, thus reducing the risk that a system aggressively
pursuing conservation savings might get caught short. As previously noted, the credit provision 47 would directly reward
extraordinary customer conservation efforts.
Absent an assurance of supply, which BPA requirements
contracts would provide, public utilities actually have an incentive not to conserve, at least until July 1, 1983, when BPA's proposed allocation policy" would become effective. Current public
agency contracts restrict their future BPA supply to an amount
roughly equivalent to their requirements on July 1, 1983, or, in
many cases, significantly less. Therefore, each utility has an
interest in maximizing demand as of that date.
44. Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United States, OTA Analysis,
Pacific Northwest Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act, S. 885, Conservation
Provisions 3 (March, 1980) (unpublished report requested by Senator Henry M.
Jackson).
45. Id. at 2.

46. Id.
47. S. 885, supra note 9, § 6(h); accord, H.R. 8157, supra note 9, § 6(h) (making
credits mandatory for conventional resources as well as conservation).
48. See text accompanying notes 8-13 supra.
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The third element that only comprehensive legislation can
provide is the novel, but strong, concept of model regional conservation standards. If states or political subdivisions did not
implement conservation standards, BPA could enforce surcharges through its sales contracts. The bill Would complement
this conservation "stick" with financial incentive "carrots,"' 9 the
requirements contracts, and the marketing scheme, all of which
purchase authority would make possible.
VII.

CONCLUSION

As the nation grows ever more vulnerable to spiraling cost
increases for imported oil and its uncertain supply, we must seek
to transcend our economic dependence on oil and increase our
use of indigenous resources such as water, wind, solar, coal, and
nuclear.
The Pacific Northwest is less oil dependent than other
regions because it is more dependent on electric energy. The
abundant, low-cost hydropower that has fueled the Northwest
economy cannot continue to satisfy all its growth needs. But
careful growth management, including aggressive, well-financed,
and planned conservation, can stretch out the supply of hydropower and keep electric costs competitive. When growth exceeds
the region's ability to "mine" power through conservation, careful planning can assure that the region selects the lowest cost
alternative resources.
Planning is the essence of the proposed Pacific Northwest
Electric Power Planning and Conservation Act. The impending
"regional war" over allocation is the greatest present impediment to planning. The bill would avert this crisis by expanding
BPA's supply of available power. The power and cost allocation
features, agreed upon by every power interest in the region and
every Northwest governor, would be dispositive: in effect, a legislative "peace treaty."
Bonneville Power Administration purchase authority is the
nub of the bill and the mechanism that would make it possible
for the region to resolve its supply and allocation problems.
Purchase authority would also lend a significant region-wide
impetus to conservation that the region could not achieve in any
other way. Finally, purchase authority would make possible a
49. E.g, S. 885, supra note 9, § 6(a) (conservation purchase); id. § 8(b) (conservation
financing); id. § 6(h) (conservation credits).
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timely, new federal-state marriage in regional electric power
planning. I have great hopes that the Regional Council will move
the Northwest toward open, broadly-based planning to chart its
energy future, and away from reliance on expensive, adversary
proceedings alone to control development.

